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this case, the Staats' water rights allowed for diversion of water for
irrigation.
The court also noted that under the department's administrative rules,
"irrigation" was defined as the artificial application of water to promote
growth of crops, and that the department interpreted the rule to mean that
only the artificial application of water constituted "irrigation."
Furthermore, according to the court, the department's interpretation of the
administrative rule deserved highly deferential judicial review, as long as
the interpretation was plausible. The court finally concluded that the
department's findings that the Staats' artificial ditches were incapable of
irrigation use, and therefore irrigation had occurred through naturally
occurring subsurface seepage on their land, were both reasonable.
Steven Marlin
Dority v. Hiller, 986 P.2d 636 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that: (1) an
irrevocable license existed for a pipeline through plaintiffs property; (2)
defendants did not abandon such license when they changed the location of
the pipeline; (3) plaintiffs did not have a property interest in the license;
and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting an injunction
requiring plaintiffs to remove riser and restore defendant's pipeline
connection).
Milton Wolsborn originally owned Dority's property, which was
situated on a diversion point on the Willamette River. In 1964, the Hillers
applied for and were granted a permit to take water from a point on
Wolsborn's property. The Hillers buried a steel pipeline from the river,
across the Dority's field, and into their property. The Hillers also installed
an electrical pole and box in order to operate the pump. They used this
pipeline to irrigate their fields.
In 1967, the Doritys purchased Wolsborn's property. The Doritys
applied for a permit to take water from the same diversion point where
Hillers obtained their water. In 1975, the Hiller's sought to replace the
steel pipeline with a plastic one. When Dority asked if they had an
easement, the Hillers replied that they had a written easement from
Wolsborn. Dority then gave them permission to install the plastic pipeline.
In 1994, quarrels began between the two parties. Dority installed a
rise and disconnected Hiller's pipeline at least once. Dority then filed suit
against the Hillers to quiet title to real property and for damages on
theories of trespass, private nuisance, and public nuisance.
The Hillers's counterclaims sought a declaration of a right to maintain
an irrigation pipeline across Dority's property. The Hillers moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that they possessed an irrevocable
license to use Dority's property for the pipeline. The trial court granted
the motion and enjoined the Doritys from interfering with the pipe
connection. The Doritys appealed.
Before reaching the merits, the Oregon Court of Appeal decided
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several preliminary issues. First, the court ruled on hearsay questions.
The court found that defendant's sworn statements as to Wolsborn's
consent were uncontroverted. Dority's affidavit stated that Wolsborn told
her he never gave permission for the pipeline or for an easement. Because
neither party ever deposed Wolsborn, nor offered this information in the
form of an affidavit, the court deemed the statements as hearsay. As such,
the evidence was such to survive the motion for summary judgment.
Second, the court found that because the Hillers installed a pipeline and
electrical device in reliance of Wolsborn's consent, such evidence sufficed
to carry the burden of proving the element of detrimental reliance.
The court then examined the merits of the case. The appeals court held
that an irrevocable license existed. A license is "an interest created in real
property when a landowner consents to the use by another of the
landowner's property in a way that would otherwise be wrongful." An
irrevocable license is one in which "the landowner's promise to allow a use
of the land for an unlimited time induces the other party to make significant
expenditures for permanent improvements, consistent with the use for
which consent was given."
Thus, the court found Hillers held an
irrevocable license.
The court held that the Hillers did not abandon their license by burying
the plastic pipeline in a different location. In order to raise a genuine issue
of a material fact about abandonment, the Doritys needed to offer evidence
that the Hillers either verbally expressed an intention to abandon, or that
their conduct demonstrated unequivocally an intent to make no future use
of the license.
Here, the Doritys gave express permission for the
installation of the plastic pipe. In the eyes of the court, this was more than
"passive acquiescence." In addition, the Hillers never indicated intent to
abandon the use of the servient estate. Nor did the court find an inference
that the Dority's permission was conditional.
Finally, the court held the Hillers properly plead entitlement to
injunctive relief and offered facts sufficient to justify injunctive relief.
Hiller's counterclaims were equitable claims. As such, the trial court was
empowered to fashion relief as would best accomplish the ends of justice."
The Doritys interfered with Hiller's use of the pipeline for two years. The
Hillers depended on the pipeline to irrigate their crops and sufficiently
stated that compensatory damages were impossible to calculate.
In
addition, the Doritys had other points of diversion from which they could
draw water. This being so, any hardship caused by the injunction would
be minimal. The court ultimately held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it granted injunctive relief in favor of the Hillers.
Karina Serkin

